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PORNOGRAPHY: AN OBSCENE CLARIFICATION
Miller engaged in a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of
four adult books and an adult film.' The advertising brochures consisted
primarily of pictures and drawings of explicit sexual couplings, with the
genital organs of the participants prominently displayed. The brochures
were received and opened by persons who had not requested them, some
of whom complained to the police. Miller was arrested and charged with
violating the California anti-obscenity law,2 which prohibits sending or
bringing obscene material into the state for sale or distribution.3 He
was convicted after a jury trial and the decision was affirmed, without
opinion, by the Appellate Department, Superior Court of California,
County of Orange. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held,
vacated and remanded: Material is subject to state prohibition as ob-
scene, where, taken as a whole, it appeals to the prurient interest; is
patently offensive in its depiction of sexual conduct as defined by state
law; and, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
The pivotal issue in cases dealing with obscenity has been the
necessity of establishing a viable test to determine whether a particular
work is obscene. The establishment of such a test is mandated by the
first amendment freedoms of speech and press. Obscenity has been held
to be outside the ambit of first amendment freedoms; 4 therefore it is
necessary to establish a test which will not suppress constitutionally pro-
tected material, not an easy task because of the unclear and hazy line
between the obscene and the non-obscene.
Prior to Miller, there were three elements to the test for obscenity:
The dominant theme of the material taken as a whole must have ap-
pealed to the prurient interest; the material was patently offensive in
its depiction of sexual conduct and therefore affronts contemporary com-
munity standards; and, the material was utterly without redeeming so-
cial value. These three elements were set forth in A Book Named 'John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure' v. Attorney General.' How-
ever, the three pronged test of Memoirs, was only accepted by three
1. MAN-WOMAN; SEX ORGIES ILLUSTRATED; AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF PORNOGRAPHY;
INTERCOURSE; and the film MARITAL INTERCOURSE.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(a) (Deering 1971).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (Deering 1969), as amended, CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (Deer-
ing 1971), for the purposes of this act:
"Obscene" means that to the average person applying contemporary standards,
the predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest,
i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes sub-
stantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of
such matters and is matter which is utterly without social importance.
4. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
5. 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as Memoirs].
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members of the Court.6 The other justices applied various elements of
the test, or rejected the view that obscene material was outside the scope
of the first amendment protection.7
The absence of a clear majority position provided little or no guid-
ance to the states or lower federal courts as to the application of the
proper tests, and to the ultimate determination of what, in fact, was
obscene. In 1967, the Court, in Redrup v. New York," reversed per
curiam a group of obscenity convictions, acknowledging the confusion
with an air of resignation. "Whichever of these constitutional views is
brought to bear upon these cases before us, it is clear that the judgments
cannot stand."9 Redrup commenced a series of per curiam reversals of
convictions for dissemination of materials which at least five members of
the Court thought not to be obscene,' ° with each justice applying his
own test. In Miller, the Court addressed itself to the previous lack of a
majority position, determined to abandon the casual practice of Redrup
and further attempted "to provide guidance to federal and state courts
alike.""
'
Miller provides a three fold test to determine whether a work is
obscene:
(a) whether the "average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest,
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offen-
sive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law, and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. 2
To fully understand the Miller tests, it is necessary to examine them
individually, with regard to the modifications they have made of the
previous standards, and with regard to the problems and questions they
raise.
The thrust of the first test, with insignificant changes in language,
is identical to the first standard provided by the Court in Roth v. United
States: "Whether to the average person applying contemporary com-
6. Justices Brennan and Fortas and Chief Justice Warren.
7. Justices Black and Douglas adopted the position that allegedly obscene material
should be constitutionally protected. Justice Stewart believed only "hard core" pornography
was outside the scope of the first amendment. Justice Harlan concurred with Stewart as to
federal violations, but adopted the view that there was some lower, yet undefined standard
in regard to state obscenity cases. Justices Clark and White relied primarily on the prurient
interest element of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
8. 386 U.S. 767 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as Redrup].
9. Id. at 771.
10. Hoit v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972)
(citations omitted).
11. 93 S. Ct. at 2618.
12. Id. at 2615.
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munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to a prurient interest."'3
The Court, in Roth, held that obscenity was not protected speech,
and thus, by analogy to the law of libel, it was not necessary to employ
the "clear and present danger" test to prohibit its dissemination. 4 The
Court was aware that any standards for determining whether a work is
obscene must safeguard certain material dealing with sex, but not that
which appeals to prurient interests, as sex and obscenity are not synon-
ymous. Roth left several questions unanswered. The most important of
these was whether a local, state, or national standard was to be applied
in determining "contemporary community standards."
In Jacobellis v. Ohio,1" the Court confronted the issue in reversing
a lower court obsenity conviction, but could not muster a majority
opinion. Three justices believed the film was not obscene and two others
believed the conviction violated free speech, absent a showing of "clear
and present danger." Chief Justice Warren, in a dissenting opinion,
argued for a local standard. "I believe that there is no provable 'national
standard' . . . . At all events, the Court has not been able to enunciate
one, and it would be unreasonable to expect local courts to divine one."'
In Warren's view, the scope of the Supreme Court's responsibility would
be limited to a determination of whether there was sufficient evidence for
an obscenity conviction. The state or lower federal courts would apply
the tests on the basis of local or state attitudes, and the Supreme Court
would not reverse a conviction unless there was insufficient evidence to
support such a verdict.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Goldberg, rejected both the em-
ployment of a local standard and the sufficient evidence test. Brennan
was of the opinion that limiting the scope of the Court's review to a
determination of sufficient evidence would be an abrogation of the Court's
duty to "uphold the constitutional guarantees. Since it is only 'obscenity'
that is excluded from the constitutional protection, the question of
whether a particular work is obscene necessarily implicates an issue of
constitutional law."' 7 Therefore, it would seem that the presence of a
13. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) [hereinafter referred to as Roth]. Material appealing to
prurient interest was defined by the Court as "material having a tendency to excite lustful
thoughts." Id. at 487, n.20 (1957).
14. In Schenck v. United States, the Court first propounded the "clear and present
danger" test:
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from
an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. The
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1918).
15. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
16. Id. at 200 (dissenting opinion).
17. Id. at 188.
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constitutional question would require the Court to make an independent
judgment on the merits.
Justice Brennan rejected the local standard argument on multiple
grounds. He argued that the protected area of expression is delineated by
the Constitution, and is, therefore, not subject to local definition and
limitation. Communities differ in tolerance to concepts other than
obscenity, and "such variances have never been considered to require or
justify a varying standard for application of the Federal Constitution."18
Justice Brennan also rejected the local standard on the grounds that
suppression of a work in one area would ultimately lead to its suppres-
sion in other areas where it would not be considered obscene. "It would
be a hardy person who would sell a book or exhibit a film after this
Court had sustained the judgment of one 'community holding' it to be
outside the constitutional protection."' 9
Thus, with no majority opinion having been issued by the Court in
lacobellis, there remained considerable conflict over the question of
what the Roth decision meant when it referred to "contemporary com-
munity standards."2 0 The controversy continued until Miller, where
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the five judge majority, held that
a state standard was to be employed in determining whether a work is
obscene.
Justice Burger relied heavily on former Chief Justice Warren's dis-
senting opinion in Jacobellis. The country is too diverse; according to
Burger, "for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could
be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation . *...,, There-
fore, as there is no provable national standard, "[i]t is neither realistic
nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring
that people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct
found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.
'22
In addition to the absence of a provable national standard, the Court
went on to discuss the applicability of a national standard to the jury
system. A national standard must be a hypothetical test, one which most
jurors would find unascertainable. The jury acts as the collective con-
science of the community and is to apply community standards. Accord-
ing to Miller, since a jury is unable to determine the national standard,
attempting to apply one is an "exercise in futility.
' '21
The second standard raised in Miller is "whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
18. Id. at 194.
19. Id.
20. See Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1158 (1966); Comment, Application of a Local or National
Standard of Decency in the Use of the Roth-Memoirs Obscenity Test, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q.
691, and the authorities cited therein for an analysis of how the lower federal and state
courts have dealt with the issue.
21. 93 S. Ct. at 2618.
22. Id. at 2619.
23. Id. at 2618.
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defined by the applicable state law."2 The progenitor of this test was
first announced by Justice Harlan in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day.2
In that case, Harlan wrote that, in addition to appealing to prurient
interest, works, to be deemed obscene, must be "so offensive on their
face as to affront current community standards of decency-a quality
that we shall hereafter refer to as 'patent offensiveness' or 'indecency.' "2G
The test basically requires that material go beyond the limits of candor,
in the sense of explicitness. Although the "patent offensiveness" test
was not raised by the majority of the Court, it generated little contro-
versy and has become one of the accepted standards in determining
whether a work is obscene.
In Miller, the Court endeavored to more carefully draft this test
without altering its basic composition. Miller provides that the state law
must confine itself to the regulation of works which depict patently of-
fensive sexual conduct. "[N]o one will be subject to prosecution for the
sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or
describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined
by the regulatory state law as written or construed."27 The Court prof-
ferred two examples of such patently offensive materials: "(a) Patently
offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal
or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representations
or description of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition
of genitals."2 These two examples were intended to provide guidance
to the states as to what type of work could reasonably be construed to
be "patently offensive." However, it is vital that prohibited conduct not
be defined in vague or obscure words, and be carefully limited so as not
to infringe on protected freedoms of speech and press. 9
The third of the Miller guidelines in determining obscenity is
"whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.""0 The adoption of this standard rejected
the "utterly without redeeming social value" test, which first appeared in
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio.3 Brennan
wrote that in applying this test, "it follows that material dealing with sex
in a manner that advocates ideas, ...or that has literary or scientific
or artistic value or any other form of social importance, may not be
branded as obscenity and denied the constitutional protection. 3 2 This
24. Id. at 2615.
25. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
26. Id. at 482.
27. 93 S. Ct. at 2616.
28. Id. at 2615.
29. The Court indicated that examples of properly drawn statutes are: OREGON LAWS
ch. 743, art 29 §§ 255-262 (1971) ; HAWAII PENAL CODE, tit. 37, §§ 1210-1216 (1972). 93 S. Ct.
at 2615 n.6.
30. 93 S. Ct. at 2615.
31. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
32. Id. at 191.
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view rejected the idea of any constitutional balancing test of weighing
social value against prurient appeal or patent offensiveness. Brennan
clarified the application of this test two years later in Memoirs:
A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly
without redeeming social value. This is so even though the book
is found to possess the requisite prurient appeal and to be
patently offensive. Each of the three federal constitutional
criteria is to be applied independently; the social value of the
book can neither be weighed against nor cancelled by its
prurient appeal or patent offensiveness."
While this test was proposed by only three members of the Court,
it was generally accepted by the states and was written into state statutes,
including the statute under which Miller was charged. The Court in
Miller expressly rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value"
test, believing that the use of this test was a misinterpretation of the
original concept of Roth v. United States.84 Roth, according to the
Miller majority, presumed obscenity to be devoid of value, while the
Memoirs plurality required affirmative proof. Memoirs, "called on the
prosecution to prove a negative, i.e., that the material was 'utterly
without redeeming social value'-a burden virtually impossible to dis-
charge under our criminal standards of proof."35
The Miller majority exhibited a marked change in emphasis, as
well as a tightening of the obscenity standards. Justice Brennan, in
Memoirs, believed that the three tests were to be applied independently
and must all coalesce to deem a work obscene. The Court, in Miller,
clearly altered this view. "At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive
depiction or description of sexual conduct must have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment protec-
tion.""6 Although this may seem to be merely a matter of semantics, it
does indicate a change in attitude on the part of the Court and fore-
shadows less difficult convictions under existing or future obscenity laws.
The Court in Miller confined the regulation to works which depict
or describe sexual conduct, specifically defined by applicable state law.
It also limited state offenses to works which, "taken as a whole, appeal
to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value."3" It was the Court's intention to
create more concrete and workable standards than those used in the past.
Unfortunately, Miller, as the cases before it, raises as many questions as
it answers.
33. 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966).
34. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See note 13 supra.
39. 93 S. Ct. at 2613.
36. Id. at 2616.
37. Id. at 2615.
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The first questions concern the efficacy of a state standard. The
Miller holding permits the states to determine whether material is to be
prohibited within their borders. However, the same arguments offered
by the Court in Miller, those of diverse tastes and tolerances, are equally
applicable on a city-by-city or county-by-county basis. It is readily
apparent that conduct which is tolerable in New York City may not be
tolerable in a small town in upstate New York. Miller fails to shed any
light on this problem. If, in fact, local communities are permitted to
establish their own standards, one can envision a veritable plethora of
tests more confusing than previous standards.
In the same vein, one must question the effect of state standards on
the film making and publishing industries. In the weeks immediately
following the Miller decision, the film Carnal Knowledge, which had
been rated "R" by the Motion Picture Rating Organization and had
won numerous awards was held to be obscene. 8 Such a decision indicates
the uncertainty facing the film maker or publisher.
The publisher or movie producer is faced with four alternatives.
He may forfeit a portion of his business by not disseminating his product
where it might be deemed obscene, or he might produce several different
versions of the work and distribute them accordingly. Neither of these
alternatives produces a desirous result for the publisher, as they would
severely decrease his profits. A third alternative is to publish the work
and run the risk of its being deemed obscene. The result here is even
less attractive, as the publisher would be forced to risk fine or imprison-
ment. The publisher's probable decision would be to produce the least
controversial work possible.
If the publisher produces the least controversial work, the resultant
effect on the public then comes into question. Chief Justice Burger's
hypothesis in Miller, that the citizen of Mississippi should not be forced
to read the same book or see the same film as the citizen of New York,
is altered in a most undesirable way. Under the old tests, the citizen of
Mississippi was not required to read or view what he would consider
obscene material. Under the Miller guidelines, if the producer distributes
the least offensive work, the citizen of New York City is unable to pro-
cure materials which are tolerable in New York, as they are no longer
produced. Thus, instead of allowing the Mississippian a free choice as to
what he wishes to read or view, the Court has in effect imposed a Missis-
sippi standard on New York City.
A third question concerns the scope of review of local court de-
cisions. Both the "prurient interest" and "patent offensiveness" standards
are measured by local tolerances under the Miller tests. The question
that must ultimately be answered is whether the appellate review at the
Supreme Court level will be limited to the "sufficient evidence" test
38. Jenkins v. Georgia, - Ga. App. -, 199 S.E.2d 183 (1973), appeal docketed, 42
U.S.L.W. 337 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1973) (73-557).
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espoused by Chief Justice Warren in Jacobellis, or whether the Court
will make an independent determination of the material's worth. An
adoption of the "sufficient evidence" standard would permit the Supreme
Court to refrain from being the ultimate censor of obscene materials.
However, such a standard would allow the states to apply the first
amendment as they see fit. An adoption of the view requiring an inde-
pendent determination of the value of a particular work would un-
doubtedly lead to the subjectivity and confusion all too apparent in
previous obscenity cases. If the Court adopts such a view, it is not
difficult to postulate that the Court will once again fall into the familiar
Redrup pattern of per curiam decisions, with little or no guidance as to
what type of conduct is prohibited.
Another question concerns the inherent conflict of the various ele-
ments of the test for obscenity. The first element, "prurient interest," will,
by the Court's definition, arouse the average person.39 However, the
second element of the test, "patent offensiveness," will tend to disgust the
average person. Thus, in addition to lacking serious value, a particular
work must both arouse and disgust the average person, which is, to say
the least, quite a feat.
Finally, it is necessary to examine the Miller majority's contention
that, "[w]hile Roth presumed 'obscenity' to be 'utterly without social
value,' Memoirs required that to prove obscenity it must be affirmatively
established that the material is 'utterly without redeeming social value.' "4o
The Miller majority relied on the language in Roth, that "implicit in
the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as
utterly without redeeming social importance."'" However, the language
referred to in Miller seems to bear more on the question of why obscenity
is outside the ambit of first amendment protections than on the question
of what is obscene. Miller, in reliance on the Roth language, obviates the
requirement of proving a lack of value. This position apparently takes
no cognizance of the Roth view that, "[a]ll ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance . . .have the full protection of
the guarantees, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited
areas of more important interests. 42 Miller seems to interpret the
language of Roth in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning of the
words.
Despite the recent attempt to clarify the situation relating to
obscenity, much confusion remains.
Any effort to draw a constitutionally accepted boundary on
state power must resort to such indefinite concepts as "prurient
interest," "patent offensiveness," "serious literary value," and
39. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487, n.20 (1957).
40. 93 S. Ct. at 2613 (emphasis in original).
41. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
42. Id.
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the like. The meaning of these concepts necessarily varies with
the experience, outlook, even idiosyncracies of the person de-
fining them. Although we have assumed that obscenity does
exist and that we "know it when [we] see it," we are manifestly
unable to describe it in advance except by reference to concepts
so elusive that they fail to distinguish clearly between pro-
tected and unprotected speech.4"
The new standards raised in Miller, whether good or bad, leave questions
unanswered. The present composition of the Court indicates that forth-
coming decisions, which are needed to resolve the conflicts, will probably
impose strict regulations on obscenity. Hopefully, the Court, in attempt-
ing to clarify these issues, will remember that the Constitution requires
that the regulation of obscenity "conform to procedures that will ensure
against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, which
is often separated from obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line.""
MITCHELL R. BLOOMBERG
"THE RIGHT, JUSTICE AND WELFARE OF THE PURCHASING
AND CONSUMING PUBLIC"?-NO LIABILITY FOR
BREACH OF WARRANTY FOR DEFECTIVE
SECONDARY CONTAINER
The plaintiff purchased a carton of Coca-Cola from a grocery store
operated by the defendant Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., Florida. When the
plaintiff lifted the carton from the display rack of the store, the bottom
of the carton allegedly failed and as a result, one bottle dropped to the
floor, broke and caused injury to the plaintiff. Defendant, Winn-Dixie,
admitted the purchase and the fact that the drinks were bottled, packaged
and supplied to it for retail sales by the co-defendant, Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Company of Miami. Coca-Cola denied all applicable elements of
the complaint. The trial court granted defendants' motions for directed
verdict on the counts of implied warranty and submitted the case to the
jury only on issues of negligence. The jury returned a verdict for the
defendants and final judgment was entered. On appeal, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held, affirmed:' There is no warranty
of merchantability by the bottler in favor of a remote buyer as to the
carton.2 Schuessler v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 279 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1973).
43. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2647 (1973) (dissenting opinion)
(citations omitted).
44. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
1. Affirmed only in respect to the issue of extension of implied warranty to manufac-
turer. Judgment as to defendant, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., was reversed and remanded.
2. There was no testimony which indicated who actually manufactured the paper
